By investigative journalist Adam Saeed
The core of the confrontation with Iran extends beyond nuclear facilities and missile stockpiles to the decision-making structures that reproduce military power and ensure its continuity. Destroying an arsenal may temporarily disable a regime’s capabilities, but it does not eliminate its ability to rebuild them as long as its networks of command, financing and weapons production remain intact.
This analysis begins by distinguishing between the visible structures of government and the actual centres of power. The Supreme Leader, the presidency and political representatives do not necessarily encompass the entire decision-making system. Behind the formal institutions, the concept of a “deep state” centres on military and intelligence networks within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), their training and cooperation ties with Russia, China and Pakistan, and the extent to which these relationships influence Iran’s strategic choices.
From this perspective, the failure of negotiations raises questions not only about the substance of any agreement but also about whether those conducting the negotiations have the authority to implement their commitments. Does the diplomatic leadership possess the power to bind military decision-makers, or do agreements encounter resistance from networks operating beyond formal state institutions? Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon is invoked here as an example of an armed organization whose power extends beyond the country’s official governing structures.
Within this framework, the argument for expanding the objectives of military operations rests on the assumption that the nuclear threat is inseparable from the structure of the Iranian regime and its strategy for survival. North Korea serves as an example of how nuclear capabilities can become a guarantee of political survival. Under this logic, striking nuclear facilities would amount to a temporary measure if the leadership retained both the determination and the means to rebuild them.
This reasoning also extends to cyber and intelligence capabilities. Communications networks, surveillance systems, technical support and supply chains may allow the regime to maintain its operational capacity even after significant damage to its military infrastructure. The central question regarding Russia and China, according to this argument, is how far their support enables Tehran to buy time, replace its losses and prolong the confrontation.
A war of attrition consequently emerges as the principal danger: the depletion of American and Israeli ammunition and resources, alongside rising defensive costs, while Iran retains the ability to replenish its capabilities. The comparison with the war in Ukraine concerns the sustainability of prolonged fighting through external supplies, despite the substantial differences between the two conflicts.
As for the strategic gain Netanyahu seeks, according to this interpretation, it is to translate military superiority into a fundamental transformation of the threat itself.
The essential question for readers is therefore whether the war targets only the instruments of Iranian power or the network that controls their deployment and reconstruction.
And who, within that network and through its external connections, ultimately holds the authority to decide on war and peace?
